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Determinism and the Problem of  
Individual Freedom in Li Zehou’s Thought
Andrew LAMBERT
Li  Z eh o u ’s  wo r k  can be understood as an account of a Chinese moder-
nity, a vision for Chinese society that seeks to integrate three distinct philo-
sophical approaches. These are Chinese history and culture, which Li under-
stands as largely Confucian; Marxism, which has exerted such influence on a 
modernizing China; and Western learning more generally, as expressed by fig-
ures such as Immanuel Kant and Sigmund Freud. Li also frequently expresses 
the hope that a Chinese modernity will be one in which the importance of the 
individual is recognized and rights and freedoms are upheld.1 But this stance 
raises an important question: how are individuality and freedom understood in 
Li’s philosophical system? In this chapter, I examine what resources Li offers to 
help us conceptualize their place in a modernity with Chinese characteristics. 
Confucian culture is often regarded as authoritarian and hierarchical, less inter-
ested than more liberal traditions in an ideal such as freedom. So how does free-
dom relate to the Confucian root of Chinese culture, as construed by Li? And 
is his call for a China that respects individual freedoms a direct consequence of 
his theoretical commitments, or it is a more personal stance?
Exploring the issues of individuality and freedom in Li’s work is impor-
tant for another reason; it enables us to better understand Li’s philosophical 
framework and how the three major influences noted above are integrated. 
Specifically, questions of individuality and freedom arise at the intersection of 
two great philosophical thrusts in Li’s work. These are a deterministic thrust, 
derived from Marxist historical materialism, and his interest in personal free-
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dom. Examining the conceptions of individuality and freedom that Li offers 
will tell us whether he can successfully navigate what appears, at least initially, 
to be a troubling tension between these two thrusts.
A Tension in Li Zehou’s Work
A tension arises from Li’s reliance on a deterministic account of the relationship 
between society and the individual, on the one hand, and his account of the indi-
vidual as a site of innovation and a starting point for social change. The Marxist 
component of Li’s theory suggests that the final explanation of why society is as 
it is, and why people act as they do, resides in the technological-social base of 
society. There is, however, something illiberal about this, since it implies that 
people’s actions are explained not by their own choices but by larger, sometimes 
unnoticed, social and economic forces. Li attempts to marry this foundation 
of historical materialism with Kantian accounts of the human psychology and 
cognitive structures. On the surface this approach is appealing, because it seems 
to bring with it Kant’s concern with freedom—that a person’s action—or more 
accurately, a person’s will—is not conditioned by external forces but is the prod-
uct of that person’s own choices. But this amalgam of two influential philoso-
phies brings its own difficulties. Specifically, it is not clear that Li has escaped 
the problem of determinism that arises when all human action is traced to an 
external material base. How do we know that the thoughts, feelings, and desires 
that lead to action are not themselves the product of external material forces, 
which we do not control?
This tension might also be stated in terms of two chains of causal influ-
ence that flow in opposite directions. The first moves from external social forces 
in toward the individual, while the second flows outward from the individual, 
bringing about change in the world around the individual. There is a puzzle 
as to how these two elements of Li’s philosophical system fit together, as well 
as the question of whether he can articulate a viable conception of human 
freedom built on a deterministic foundation. What follows is an attempt to 
articulate that tension and to explore possible resolutions to it suggested in Li’s 
work, including the various conceptions of freedom that he considers. Can Li’s 
work bequeath a novel account of freedom—a freedom consistent with Confu-
cian values—or is his work too invested in the kind of social determinism from 
which liberal reformers wish to escape? We are looking for an account of how 
the individual in Li’s system can be an agent of change in his or her environment 
while also being the product of that environment.
In what follows, I first outline the tension in Li’s work. I describe the social 
determinism implicit in Li’s adaptations of Marxist ideas, in notions such as the 
cultural-psychological formation (wenhua xinli jiegou) and sedimentation ( jid-
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ian). I then explore accounts of individuality and freedom in Li’s work, which 
might provide philosophical justification for contemporary calls for personal 
freedom and respect for human rights. To anticipate what then follows, I argue 
that some of those accounts, particularly those that draw on Kant’s work on 
rationality and the will, are problematic; but Li’s work in aesthetics does offer a 
novel account of freedom and a valuable form of individuality with Confucian 
characteristics. This freedom involves orienting desires and emotions toward 
shared communal objects and experiences, which allows for the coordination of 
desires (not merely private desire satisfaction) and the capacity to generate aes-
thetic goods such as beauty, delight, and a sense of ease. This freedom is some-
thing cultivated, not merely possessed as a right, and emerges from a variety of 
cultivated psychological responses that are grounded in stable social structures 
and human relationships.
First, however, a clarification is necessary. Li’s work is complex and mul-
tifaceted. He covers much ground, from Kant, Marx, and Heidegger to, more 
recently, Michael Sandel’s work on justice.2 Some have criticized Li for glossing 
too lightly over major thinkers and their ideas.3 Setting aside this reservation, 
Li describes his own work as opening up new lines of inquiry and offering sug-
gestive but speculative theories, rather than systematically developing a single 
theme or idea.4 As a result, an attempt such as this to focus narrowly on par-
ticular themes or assertions in Li’s work is vulnerable to an objection—namely, 
that Li offers the grounds for a response elsewhere in his vast collection of writ-
ings. This possibility cannot be ruled out, although disparate comments and 
thoughts are not necessarily complete responses. More importantly, I hope that 
the following discussion will serve to unpack some of Li’s valuable contribu-
tions to Chinese thought and, as Li himself hopes, encourage more discussion 
of ideas broached but not fully explored in his writing.
Determinism in Li’s Work: Historical Materialism
Li offers a theory of what he calls historical ontology or anthropological ontol-
ogy. This is derived from Marx’ deterministic theory of historical materialism, 
which Li explicitly commends as a mode of social explanation5 but which fea-
tures important differences. Li shares with Marx the conviction that most fun-
damental explanation of human existence is rooted in the material and social 
worlds. Human life is ultimately to be understood in terms of the development 
of tool use and the evolution of productive forces such as science and technol-
ogy. In his On Traditional Chinese Intellectual History, Li quotes approvingly 
from The German Ideology, in which Marx emphasizes how society and social 
structure determine the life of the individual, as the following quote illustrates: 
“Individuals find their conditions of existence predestined, and hence may have 
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their position in life and their personal development assigned to them by their 
class, and become subsumed under it.”6 As Li’s use of this passage makes clear, 
individual life is conditioned by a more fundamental social reality.7 Wanting to 
understand the nature of human life, we should not start from first-person expe-
rience and subjective reflection, for these are merely the outcome of productive 
forces and social practices. Instead, we must first understand the latter and how 
they give rise to the kind of consciousness and patterns of thought experienced 
at the personal and subjective level.
However, Li’s ideas are to be distinguished from classical Marxism in sev-
eral important ways. First, Li has little interest in class as a unit of social analysis; 
he focuses more on technology, social practices and their historical origins, and 
the effects of both on the individual person. Also, while Li’s work retains the 
notion of historical evolution, he discards the idea that society evolves through 
discrete stages of history. No objective blueprint or schedule of social evolution 
can be identified, and history does not progress toward a revolutionary con-
clusion.8 Science, technology, and productive forces do drive the evolution of 
human society, but their effects are understood, not in terms of broad social cat-
egories such as discrete historical epochs, but rather in terms of the psychology 
of the individual. This focus on the inner life of the individual is arguably Li’s 
most important difference from Marx. Unlike Marx, who might dismiss first-
person experiences as false consciousness or for failing to reflect deeper struc-
tural realities, Li grants theoretical weight to the structure of inner experiences. 
But he retains the deterministic thrust of Marx’ work: changing technology and 
social conditions generate and structure an individual psychology.
Li’s use of the term “psychology” (xinli) here is very broad, including 
diverse aspects of human consciousness such as concepts, emotions, and desires. 
This direct link between productive forces or social practices, on the one hand, 
and the mental lives of individuals on the other is captured by Li’s idea of the 
cultural-psychological formation (wenhua-xinli jiegou). In Li’s words, “Human 
psychology is the product of our human history.”9 The exact causal pathways 
involved are, Li maintains, empirical matters rather than theoretical questions 
and are difficult to specify in the absence of advances in empirical psychology. 
Nevertheless, this framework for explaining human consciousness, or “psychol-
ogy,” illustrates Li’s deterministic account of how society progresses.
The deterministic nature of this framework can be articulated in at least 
three ways. The first is that all concepts have their origins in external social 
practices. In this, Li agrees with anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s claim that 
human nature is the product of history and culture.10 Even the most fundamen-
tal concepts and categories through which humans experience and make sense 
of the world originate in social practices. These include concepts such as time 
and causation. Li thus opposes philosophers, such as Kant, who claim a priori 
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knowledge or categories of experience. Even ideas that seem to us to be com-
monsense, requiring no education and having no basis in any particular social 
practice are found, upon correct investigation, to be the product of some social 
practice (though it might be so ancient that we are no longer aware of the link 
between practice and thought). There is thus no a priori structure of human 
cognition or thought that is independent of social context and material forces. 
The individual mind is entirety rooted in the external world.
A second feature of this system, which ties thought to external social prac-
tice, is the tendency toward cultural relativism at both the conceptual and eval-
uative (moral) levels. The forms of life or social practices determine the concep-
tual and normative frameworks through which communities and individuals 
understand the world. For example, those who lived in farming communities 
would understand the world in terms of those practices that constituted agri-
cultural production. In the case of China, Li explains how a distinctively Chi-
nese cultural-psychological formation can be traced back to Confucian culture 
and to the primitive agrarian society that preceded Confucius.11 Li identifies 
in that tradition two particular foundational social practices that structured 
people’s worldview: clan-based hierarchical social relationships and ritual, both 
of which date from prehistoric times.
Clan structures, which gave rise to stable communities and prized senior-
ity, shaped Confucian moral ideals such as humaneness (ren),12 while ritual was 
the attempt to codify early efforts to organize human use of tools to meet basic 
human needs.13 But ritual also had a psychological function: participating in 
ritualized practice served to implant ideas and ways of seeing the world into 
the minds of participants, bringing about shared social understandings that 
generated social order. People’s attention and thinking were drawn to the same 
things—such as the practices that produced and sustained crops in an agricul-
tural society; they experienced the same emotions toward those features of the 
world, and those emotions were also reinforced through joyous, aesthetically 
striking ritualized songs and dance;14 and they experienced a sense of unity of 
harmony as a result of such social and emotional unity. Such shared norms and 
understandings were then formally codified as laws and institutions. In this way, 
social practices such as ritual determined subjects’ conceptual understanding, 
emotional dispositions, and sense of what was rational or reasonable.
The role of social practices in structuring individual psychology and judg-
ment can be traced down through Chinese history. Li also offers a similar histor-
ical and cultural analysis regarding how beauty evolved within the Chinese tra-
dition and how this form of aesthetic consciousness is different from the kinds 
of aesthetic appreciation that emerged in non-Chinese cultural traditions.15
This theoretical approach has several strengths. Li’s theory and the theo-
retical defense of relativism therein allow for the Chinese (i.e., Confucian) tra-
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dition to be treated as an independent historical and cultural tradition, not one 
to be understood through Western historical models (though clearly Li borrows 
from Marx to some extent). Different cultural traditions can, over time, interact 
and influence each other, but they do so as equals, such that any “Western” cul-
tural tradition might take as much from China as China takes from it. Another 
strength of Li’s framework derives from the weight it grants to history and 
existing tradition in explaining both society and the life of the individual. The 
socially grounded holistic nature of this theory provides a plausible rationaliza-
tion of Confucian values, in which history and tradition are so prominent. Li’s 
historical ontology enables him to defend the Confucian tradition, making the 
values and claims that define that it appear broadly reflective of truths about 
underlying reality.
However, the relativism of this framework also creates difficulty for under-
standing how freedom and individuality fit into it. Given its implicit conceptual 
and moral relativism, the question arises of whether individuals can conceive of 
the world in ways independent of the historically rooted practices under whose 
influence they live. Similarly, the framework suggests that the subject’s norma-
tive judgments—what the subject considers reasonable, good, right, beautiful, 
and so forth—are conditioned by the social environment in which they live. 
Such a stance does not deny the possibility of critical reflection, but it does sug-
gest that it arises only within a framework rooted in a preexisting social reality. 
Further, the importance of unity and shared socially responsive emotions raises 
questions about the relative importance of dissent, resistance, and individuality.
A third deterministic force in Li’s work is his account of human nature as, 
in part, a biologically grounded human nature. Certain biological needs or dis-
positions are common to all members of the species and are reflected in certain 
social practices. The clearest example of this is Li’s account of filial conduct 
(xiao). The importance of this value in Confucian thought stems partly from 
the fact that it reflects a generic human nature—the affective bond between 
parent and child. Parents feel love toward offspring, while children feel respect 
and fear toward parents.16 The biological reality of this bond is, Li argues, 
expressed in Analects 17.21.17 Therein, Zaiwo questions the need for three years 
of mourning for parents; Confucius answers that cultivated persons find “no 
relish” in “fine food,” “no pleasure” in “music,” and “no comfort” in “lodgings.” 
For Li, this line is evidence of a deep psychological bond between child and par-
ent that is rooted in biology.
Presenting Confucianism as a form of naturalism, in which generic features 
of humanity shape the conceptions of ethics that governs human life, is plau-
sible and has a textual basis. However, it raises questions for other parts of Li’s 
grander philosophical system. Specifically, it raises questions about how such 
biological forces fit with the cultural and social practices described above, and 
Ames - Li Zehou.indb   99 12/28/2017   5:26:30 PM
100 Li Zehou and the Modernization of Confucianism
the role that each plays in determining individual psychology. Which aspects 
of that psychology are due to social factors and which are biological? Perhaps 
this question can be left open as an empirical issue awaiting investigation. What 
matters is that this form of explanation adds another deterministic element to 
Li’s theory.
We should note, however, that Li himself also claims biology as a source of 
individuality and uniqueness.18 He insists that the particular biologically deter-
mined differences that arise between people (presumably, differences such as 
height and even temperament) can never be adequately captured by theory and 
must be accepted as a form of individuality. To what extent biologically deter-
mined differences between people are more significant than biologically deter-
mined similarities is a substantial debate that cannot be settled here. Suffice it to 
say that, given how appeals to biology in settling the question of human nature 
are inherently deterministic, there is scope for questioning whether Li’s appeal 
to biology further reduces the scope for a theory of undetermined, free human 
action. Since this is an open question, I will set aside the question of biological 
determinism in what follows.
Let us summarize the deterministic strand of Li’s thought. Li’s theory pro-
vides an explanation of how various forces condition individual psychology 
without themselves being subject to the endorsement of the individual. Follow-
ing Marx, material forces and technology determine the social practices that 
constitute society, and these in turn determine the inner lives of people in those 
societies, including both the conceptual schemes through which they order 
experience, their emotional responses, and their conceptions of rationality and 
the reasonable. Further, such processes are understood as arising within specific 
historical and cultural traditions, and Li’s work mainly focuses on the form 
such forces have taken within Chinese history. This is captured in the much-
discussed slogan “xiti zhongyong” (“a Western root with Chinese application” 
西体中用):19 a broadly Marxist ontology is applied to Chinese history. This 
means that Chinese social practices and accompanying psychology have been 
influenced by a civilization rooted in hierarchical clan and kinship relations and 
ritual practices. It was from this root in agricultural communities that Confu-
cian thought emerged and sought to refine and respond to such circumstances. 
So what room does this account leave for individuality, such that a modern 
China can be the product of the cultural forces that created it, yet also grant 
greater recognition to individual persons as they emerge against such a back-
ground of culturally determined norms, thoughts, and feelings?
Unlike classical Marxism, this account has no transcendental historical 
narrative or God’s-eye perspective that the intellect can draw upon to ascertain 
the fundamental laws of history—knowledge of which would constitute free-
dom from the confusion of everyday social life. The direction of social trends 
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and thus individual psychology cannot be charted in advance. If rational 
judgments and emotional responses are conditioned by our social lives, then 
the conceptual space for individual choice, unconditioned by social forces, 
diminishes.
This suits the Confucian tradition and the idea that all selves are social 
selves, but it creates challenges for ideals such as freedom and self- determination. 
For example, in a society in which being a filial son, receptive to parental need 
and opinion, is highly valued, it becomes harder to explain and positively value 
a person who does not behave in such a way but, rather, seeks to live a more 
independent life. As Li often discusses, the Confucian tradition frequently pro-
motes the ideal of a thoroughgoing unity, perhaps best expressed in the idea of 
tianren heyi (unity of the cosmos and humanity). As the Liushi Chunqiu states, 
“Unity brings peace, and differences bring danger.”20 Given such an emphasis 
on unity, what prospects are there for a Chinese modernity that is molded by 
earlier social practices but can accommodate greater emphasis on individuality, 
without abandoning that past?
This is not to claim that Li’s work lacks any responses to this question; 
rather, the deterministic forces contained within Li’s own theoretical frame-
work present challenges to any account of how the direction of causation and 
influence flow the other way—from the individual out into the social world. 
Li hopes to provide such an account by drawing European Enlightenment 
thought, specifically, on Kant’s notion of the rational and autonomous subject. 
But how does this work, and is Li successful?
Li on the Power of the Individual to Initiate Social Change
To understand the reverse process—that of the individual subject controlling 
and reordering the social world—it is useful to understand the point at which 
human action arises in Li’s system, at least from the subject’s point of view. As 
noted above, the inner life of the subject, xinli (often translated as “psychol-
ogy”), is one element in Li’s cultural-psychological formation. Although I will 
use the term “psychology” here for the sake of consistency, it should be noted 
that xinli is broader in meaning that the English term suggests. Xinli refers to 
the point at which a person or subject encounters or experiences the world, and 
it includes all the reactions, feelings, motivations, and thoughts that a person 
has when confronting events in the world. Given this psychology, the human 
subject as active agent is captured by Li’s term zhutixing.21 This word is usu-
ally translated as “subjectivity” or “subjectality” (to underline the difference 
between it and passive notions of subjectivity). Li writes that zhutixing refers 
to a human person who has “the capacity of an active entity” and who has “an 
active capability in relation to its environment.”22
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In articulating this active quality of the human subject, Li follows Kant’s 
division of the human subject into the three realms of the intellect (cognition), 
the aesthetic, and the moral. Li emphasizes that the origin of the active quality 
lies within that part of the psychological formation that constitutes the moral 
realm, and the moral will in particular. In his “Fourth Outline of Human Sub-
jectivity,” Li writes that “morality is prior to cognition.”23 Thus, despite the criti-
cal stance taken in his earlier work on Kant,24 Li in later work is drawn back to 
Kant’s account of the moral realm as a realm of freedom.
In his Outline of My Philosophy (Zhexue gangyao),25 Li comes to view 
the categorical imperative, and the capacity to abide by it, as the ability that 
distinguishes humans qua humans (in contrast to animals, which lack this 
form of rationality). Li, pace Kant, still holds that all ideas and norms have 
their origin in social practice and experience; but he accepts that certain ideas 
or principles (including the categorical imperative) are so central to how a 
person thinks that they appear to be a priori or innate. Thus, although Kant 
was mistaken about the origins of the categorical imperative—claiming it to 
be the product of pure practical reason—he was correct in ascribing to it the 
highest possible moral worth. That is because the categorical imperative indi-
cates a will, a morally good will, which is conditioned in a special and law-like 
way. At its simplest, the will is a conscious striving to bring about the ends 
that an agent seeks to realize. But such willing is vulnerable to the vagaries of 
desire and the emotions and is thus not free. Only a will that is structured by 
a commitment solely to those ends that could reasonably be endorsed by any 
rational agent is a truly good will. And in making one’s will conform to such 
universal law-like regularity, the subject attains freedom—from the deter-
ministic empirical world and from the capricious influences of the body and 
human desire.
The capacity to set one’s will in such a way that it cannot be swayed by 
empirical concerns is also a source of personal worth. Willful fortitude in the 
face of both the world and one’s narrower self-interest bestows the highest 
worth on human life. If humans are capable, as rational individuals, of obey-
ing the categorical imperative, then they are worthy of respect qua individuals. 
Understanding the inner life of the human subject in this way would thus pro-
vide a theoretical justification for greater recognition of individual rights and 
individual freedoms in contemporary Chinese society.
Appealing to Kant to develop an account of freedom consistent with 
the features of the Chinese Confucian tradition stressed by Li faces difficul-
ties, however. Specifically, its relation to other elements of Li’s theory is puz-
zling.26 Furthermore, I believe that Li’s work contains other more interesting 
ideas, which could be developed into an account of freedom without relying on 
a Kantian framework.
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Problems with the Kantian Notion of Freedom
Various problems accompany this attempted merger of Kantian and Marxist 
thought; here I consider three. First, it is possible to question Li’s appeal to 
Kant’s categorical imperative by directly questioning the value of appealing to 
the categorical imperative as the ground of freedom and individual dignity—
that is, by questioning the assumptions made in Kant’s moral philosophy. The 
most direct challenge is to ask why binding oneself to a law, allowing oneself to 
be constrained by it, should be understood as a form of freedom. Kant’s answer 
was that this law-like structuring of the will was a form of pure practical reason, 
a higher former of rationality than instrumental reasoning. It insulated subjects 
from the deterministic forces of the empirical world and allowed the agents to 
be author of their own laws. But this idea requires belief in this special form of 
rationality, which many philosophers have rejected. Setting aside this question, 
there is the simpler objection that the categorical imperative presents a counter-
intuitive account of freedom. Rather than consisting of being bound to a law, 
freedom is often understood as liberating oneself from compulsion and reject-
ing laws or rules. Arguably, this is a more intuitively plausible and compelling 
notion of freedom.
Furthermore, there is the objection that the categorical imperative amounts 
to an empty formalism—it permits too much and thus cannot serve to ensure 
that personal freedom is protected. Its lack of specificity means that it could be 
used to justify or permit policies or actions that threaten personal freedoms, 
since it is unclear whether the policies or actions are “universalizable” or not. As 
Li himself notes, Kant regarded this ethical commitment as being compatible 
with the restriction of voting rights to property owners.27 Hence, abstract moral 
principles alone, despite the well-meant supervisory role of rational reflection, 
do not guarantee the safeguarding of individual rights and freedoms that Li 
calls for. Rather than pursue such objections to Kant’s moral theory, however, I 
will focus instead on its relation to Li’s philosophical system.
Problems Integrating the Categorical Imperative into  
Li’s Theoretical Framework
The first issue to be considered regarding integration of the categorical impera-
tive into Li’s theoretical framework is how the categorical imperative can be a 
foundational principle, given that Li rejects Kant’s category of the a priori in 
human cognition. More specifically, given that such a form of rationality is not 
crucial to the Confucian tradition—a tradition in which, according to Li, prag-
matic reasoning (shiyong lixing) dominates—then how could it come to hold 
a dominant place in the psychological formation of a subject immersed in that 
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tradition?28 It might be a worthy moral ideal, one that all people should adopt, 
but this does answer the question of how it comes to have authority with the 
particular cultural-psychological formation that develops within the Confucian 
tradition.
In fact, Li has an answer to this question, at least in theory. One of the 
appealing features of Li’s system is that the cultural-psychological formation 
of a group or tradition is unbounded—it is open to all influences, as long as 
these can be integrated into existing social practices and categories of under-
standing. Over time and through interaction with other cultures, globalized 
psychological formations could emerge. The Chinese tradition—as one set 
of social practices, along with concepts and feelings that make up individual 
 psychology—could absorb other initially alien influences, including the idea 
of the categorical imperative. In a global marketplace of concepts and ways of 
thinking and feeling, the categorical imperative could emerge as the acme of 
reason, something to which subjects feel a strong commitment.
Li seems to present the categorical imperative in this way, as a universal 
ideal toward which all people or cultures will evolve. This is a possibility. How-
ever, for at least two reasons we can ask whether it should be treated as such a 
foundational, authoritative norm.
First, the appeal of Li’s original account was its implicit call for greater 
recognition of different cultural traditions, each of which might prioritize dif-
ferent moral principles or norms. Importing the categorical imperative into an 
account of Chinese modernity and freedom threatens to undermine this feature 
of Li’s work. This is particularly relevant in the case of China because, and here 
lies the second reservation, the Confucian tradition emphasizes commitment 
to personal attachments and family. Such commitments to nearest and dear-
est can conflict with commitments to the kind of impartiality represented by 
the categorical imperative, and such that it is not clear which should take pri-
ority.29 Thus, whether or not the categorical imperative will become a global 
foundational moral principle seems, according to Li’s own theory of cultural-
psychological formation, to be an open question, one answered only by seeing 
how social and historical practices do, in fact, evolve.
The Categorical Imperative Obscures Other Elements of Li’s Thought 
Relevant to Freedom
A further reason to resist the temptation to appeal to Kantian moral theory in 
the context of a Chinese modernity is that it obscures other important aspects 
of Li’s work, which can themselves form the basis of novel conceptions of free-
dom and individuality. The rich psychological picture of the human subject 
developed by Li, particularly in his work on aesthetics, differs from the more 
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restrictive psychology of action involved in upholding the categorical impera-
tive. For instance, Kant famously does not grant any moral authority to feel-
ings in the determination of action. But in Li’s psychology, feelings are reliable 
because they partly derive from and reflect social and historical order. Indeed, 
Li explicitly disagrees with Kant here: “I think he [Kant] places too great an 
emphasis on the rational faculties. Many other psychological functions partici-
pate in the free play [of ideas]; these include the emotions, sensations, desires, 
and the unconscious.”30 Here Li is talking about Kant’s conception of aesthetics, 
but the comment also applies to the contrast between the two accounts of how 
human action ideally arises. The Kantian view treats rational action as having 
a specific form. It is acting according to principle, which involves the willful 
“overruling” of potentially disruptive impulses. This kind of willful self- control 
is the grounds of freedom and self-respect. In contrast, Li’s “psychology” of 
rational action is more nebulous, recognizing that a broader array of forces can 
be the source of reasonable conduct. Li’s psychology suggests a sensibility in 
which action arises from various mental events; these include emotions and 
intuitions that are not clearly connected to a principle or any systematic con-
ception of action or desired ends. Such actions might merely seem, intuitively, 
to be appropriate.
In addition to the recognition of different sources of rationality, there is 
also an issue of rational sensitivity. Emphasizing the conditioning of the will 
according to a specific principle diminishes sensitivity to the many factors con-
sidered irrelevant to that principle. But the psychological subject in Li’s work is 
responsive to a much wider set of influences, since his or her sensitivity is not 
the product of a single principle and can treat such influences as reasonable or 
rational. This can be thought of as an aesthetic sensibility, which grants motiva-
tional force to emotion, intuition, and even unconscious influences. In fact, it is 
Li’s work in aesthetics that furnishes his most interesting conception of freedom 
and individuality, one that is consistent with many of the features of the Con-
fucian tradition that Li describes. Before turning to that account, we should 
note another major development in Li’s work that sits uneasily with attempts to 
elevate Kantian moral theory to a global ideal.
In following Kant, Li has unwittingly accepted a host of cultural assump-
tions that are implicit in Kant’s narrow focus on the will but do not fit the cul-
tural assumptions ascribed to the Confucian tradition. Kant was a puritanical 
moralist and, as Bertrand Russell notes, Puritanism has produced a morality that 
places great emphasis on the will—that is, free and knowing personal choice.31 
But a Puritan morality of personal conduct might be of limited relevance to 
a tradition infused with Confucian values, which lacks any developed notion 
of will in the Kantian sense.32 Furthermore, Li has good reason to be wary of 
any conception of action that conveys religious ideas, such as Puritanism. This 
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wariness derives from his claim that the Chinese tradition be understood as a 
“culture grounded in pleasant feeling” (legan wenhua 乐感文化), sometimes 
translated as a “culture of optimism.”
The basic premise of legan wenhua is that the Chinese tradition features a 
“one world” view.33 There is only one realm from which ultimate human mean-
ing can be derived, and it is the historical and social human world. No higher 
transcendental realm exists to guide conduct. This is confirmed in the ideal of a 
unity of the cosmic and the human (tianren heyi).34 The Chinese tradition thus 
contrasts with traditions that derive their ethical and social codes from a creator 
God. However, the will as the source of human action is important in the Puri-
tanical moral tradition because it is the instrument through which the subject 
can make himself or herself worthy of entering a divine realm, a second world. 
It is redolent with self-denial and a flawed human nature (responsible intrusive 
passions), which is overcome by an appropriately conditioned will. Insofar as Li 
strongly opposes any suggestion of a transcendent world in the Chinese tradi-
tion, he is compelled to reject any construal of a human will derived from such 
metaphysical assumptions; and Kant’s work emerges from just such a religious 
orientation.
In addition to making us wary of any account of freedom too firmly 
grounded in the notion of a moral will, Li’s notion of a culture grounded in 
pleasant feelings (legan wenhua) also serves as the starting point for a different 
conception of freedom and individuality. This is one grounded in pleasure and 
the aesthetic sensibility. Li’s idea of legan wenhua offers a different picture of 
the origins of worthwhile human action. Life is short and its hazards many, and 
such insecure conditions lead to an existential drive to make the most of life 
in this world, without recourse to a higher realm. Under such conditions, the 
highest human end is the ability to realize pleasure despite the circumstances; 
and in the Confucian tradition, such pleasure is primarily realized in the pur-
suit of the everyday social life and in particular through interpersonal relation-
ships.35 This idea, combined with Li’s nuanced and realistic picture of psychol-
ogy and rational action, can be used to develop an aesthetic notion of individual 
freedom that is consistent with Li’s account of the Confucian tradition.
Freedom and Individuality in an Aesthetic Tradition
In developing his aesthetics, Li again follows Kant, accepting his threefold divi-
sion of the realms of human experience into intellectual, moral, and aesthetic. 
While the kind of freedom developed via the categorical imperative resides in 
the intellectual or rational realm, it is possible to approach freedom through an 
account of the self as an aesthetic sensibility. The power to reorder and remake 
the world (freedom) resides not solely in intellectual capacity and conscious 
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willful striving but also in cultivated and reliable aesthetic responses, allied with 
practical skill and imagination. Li explains the notion of aesthetics in this way: 
“Aesthetics is the sedimentation of social entities (concepts, ideals, attitudes, 
and meanings) onto psychological functions, particularly the emotions and 
sensory cognition.”36
On this account, freedom consists in a kind of attunement to the social 
world in which the subjects are immersed, which enhances their capacity for 
action. An already-existing external social reality permeates and molds inner 
emotions or, to use Li’s term, humanizes inner nature (ziran de renhua).37 The 
freedom that this process, when coupled with the relevant practical training 
and skills, enhances is the capacity to contribute to the lives of those with whom 
one shares everyday life—that is, to lead them to aesthetic experiences broadly 
categorized as pleasant (le). This conception of freedom has strong affinities 
with a Confucian culture rooted in personal ties and pleasant feeling (legan 
wenhua). It is the logical consequence of a worldview lacking a transcendental 
realm of value, and it expresses traditional Confucian ideals such as delight or 
pleasure (le 乐), homeliness or repose (an 安), and ease ( yi 逸), which are much 
discussed in Chinese aesthetics.38
This account of freedom emerges from Li’s account of the cultural- 
psychological formation, which includes an aesthetic psychological formation.39 
The human subject becomes increasingly sensitive to aesthetic experiences in 
two ways: through the increasingly aesthetic quality of the environment as it is 
shaped by human activity, and through individual education in, among other 
things, music and poetry, both of which cultivate an aesthetic sensibility.40 The 
result is an inner nature—thoughts, sensibility, dispositions, and motivations—
that gradually harmonizes with external circumstances and social practices. 
The subjects becomes better able to respond to their environment and produce 
actions that, in their social milieu, bring about shared delight or, as Li also calls 
it, beauty. Aesthetic sensibility can serve as the basis for practical action in the 
social world because “musical harmony is similar in structure to the harmony 
of human relationships,” an idea rooted in the Xunzi and the Zuozhuan.41 The 
idea is that actions, like music, that powerfully convey sensuous experiences can 
influence human emotions and desires and thus can direct action and remove 
conflict.
This conception of freedom as the developing of an aesthetic sensibility, 
and a practical ability grounded in that sensibility, can be sketched further by 
examining Li’s gloss on Analects 8.8, which reads: “Be awakened by poetry, be 
established by ritual, be perfected in music.”42 According to Li, this passage rep-
resents a developmental pathway to an enhanced level of agency or influence in 
the world. Let us consider each part of this three-part development account of 
character in turn, for each conveys an important aspect of aesthetic freedom.
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The phrase “Be awakened by poetry” echoes Confucius’ exhortation to his 
followers to read the Classic of Songs to develop a richer vocabulary (Analects 
17.9). For Li, however, “Be awakened by poetry” is a reference not merely to 
poetry or sung verse but to all literary forms. Reminiscent of a plea for a human-
ities-style education, it is a call to be well read and familiar with all sources of 
basic knowledge about the world—politics, history, and so forth. Li describes 
such learning as “establishing the structure of the intellect,” or the “internaliza-
tion of rationality.”43 The goal is to acquire a more sophisticated conceptual 
grasp of the details and subtleties of the surrounding world, within which the 
subject must live and act.
There are two ways in which such learning contributes to an aesthetic con-
ception of freedom. First, the literature and ideas that a subject acquires are 
those of a shared tradition, and this shared cultural understanding facilitates 
practical interactions. Any person embedded in the Confucian tradition will 
see the world through the common ideas of the classical texts and history, which 
have shaped the present. Furthermore, these ideas and concepts are not “cold” 
and inertly factual; they include a “warm” affective and motivating element. 
For example, heroic figures arouse emotions among all persons who are aware 
of their deeds. Ideally, a learned person can appeal to and utilize these shared 
images and motifs in directing the conduct of others, on account of this shared 
emotional resonance among members of that tradition.44 One example is how 
shared motifs in Confucian poetry consistently arouse certain emotions in the 
reader, as in a person who consistently feels sadness at witnessing the suffering 
of others. Li’s quote from Sui and Tang dynasties scholar Kong Yingda is apt 
here: “What one expresses in a poem is but one’s own personal heart; yet this 
‘personal’ heart is actually the heart of the whole people.”45 Scholarly learning 
thus comes to have a practical impact on society.
The second phrase in Analects 8.8, “be established by ritual,” expresses a 
further aspect of aestheticized freedom, one in which practical accomplish-
ments are central. Within Li’s philosophical framework, the rites refer to the 
social practices that create and sustain a social or geographical community. 
Ritual is important for three reasons. First, “ritual” refers to the passive training 
of character and to the internalization of communal regulations.46 This might 
include forming the habit of daily greetings for parents. Habitually complying 
with norms enables subjects to function within the social practices that consti-
tute their social world.
The second reason is that the Confucian emphasis on ritual also involves 
an active component, in that a social philosophy based on ritual idealizes practi-
cal mastery. The human subject must act in various social settings and so must 
learn to manipulate the relevant physical objects appropriately; this requires an 
understanding of how they work and the laws that govern them. Unlike mere 
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ceremony, the relevant kind of rituals here requires application and practice 
to master—such as the six Confucian arts, which include charioteering and 
archery. While such practical learning and knowledge of governing laws is ini-
tially directed to objects treated in a ritual context, this basic mode of learning 
applies to practical conduct in general. It produces people who are able to work 
with and make use of objective laws of nature—in a manner that is described 
in Xunzi’s naturalistic account of tian (the cosmos or heavens).47 People must 
understand the laws that govern the behavior of objects that they use. A subject 
with such practical and theoretical know-how can, for example, plant and har-
vest crops successfully, as well as skillfully maintain good relations with others. 
Ritual is thus a means to being practically effective in the world in general.
A third function of ritual in the classical Confucian account is the mold-
ing of a specific set of biologically grounded emotional responses. The emo-
tional lives of humans can be ordered, and their emotional connections with 
others adjusted, through ritual practice. For Li, humans and animals share cer-
tain primitive desires and emotions—as Analects 2.7 notes, for example, dogs, 
horses, and humans all naturally have feelings for their parents. But what distin-
guishes the humans is the capacity to cultivate and refine such feelings. This is 
the purpose of ritual, and such refined feelings are constitutive of the Confu-
cian ideal of humaneness (ren).
For example, Li understands xiao 孝 (filial conduct) as an emotional sensi-
bility, and ritual should refine the natural love of child for parents into the emo-
tions of filial conduct, which he characterizes as respect and fear.48 Ritual thus 
cultivates the emotions integral to family life, enabling individuals to flourish 
therein. But the task of cultivating the emotions continues beyond the family. In 
order to become “humane” (ren), this emotional engagement must develop into 
a compassion for others that extends as far as the clan network extends. The key 
idea here, also captured by Li’s phrase “humanization of nature,” is that ritual 
serves to cultivate the emotional life of the subject. After all, individuals can fail 
to develop their emotional responses, remaining in tension with or baffled by 
the practices and emotions in their surrounding social world.
The third phrase of Analects 8.8, “be perfected in music,” indicates the 
final element of a freedom that is rooted in the aesthetic realm: music. Li notes, 
“If the self-cultivation of the gentleman does not include the study of rites and 
music, it is impossible for him to become a complete person [cheng 诚].”49 How 
does music contribute to an account of freedom?
The simplest answer is that it cultivates an emotional responsiveness—
one who is exposed to and appreciates music has a fuller range of emotional 
responses.50 Furthermore, the coordination and attunement that musical mas-
tery involves—appreciating which notes, rhythms, and melodies fit together; 
coordinating between music, voices, and instruments—is functionally similar 
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to the workings of the emotional realm. Someone who appreciates musical har-
mony will also appreciate how emotions relate to and transition into each other 
and can find harmony among them. Consequently, the inner life of the “com-
plete person” is characterized by heightened or more intense emotions, espe-
cially delight.51 The figure of Confucius illustrates this ideal, saying of himself, 
“This is the kind of man he is—so enthusiastic he forgets to eat, so joyful he 
forgets his sorrow, and totally unaware that old age is coming” (Analects 7.18).
This education in affective coordination and complementarity, cultivated 
through musical training, translates to the human social world, where the same 
challenges of coordination and finding appropriate arrangements arise. Affec-
tive states cultivated by music become the foundation of thought and action. 
That is, the complete person’s practical responses to the world arise from emo-
tional sensibilities and yet are reliable, or “on the mark.” This is partly because 
the emotional realm, although a higher realm of human experience, is not 
separated from the intellectual and practical dimensions of human cultivation 
but builds on the achievements of these other two realms. Li writes, “The aes-
thetic is purely sensuous but at the same time comprehends a history of rational 
sedimentation; it is natural but at the same time incorporates the accumulated 
achievements of society.”52 Cultivated persons in some sense embody the forces 
that Li identifies as driving social progress in general. Their rational sensibility 
reflects the sedimentation of traditional knowledge and social practices; they 
have achieved practical mastery, and their emotional reactions are structured 
by those social practices, enabling them to find beauty therein. This highest 
state of cultivation is what Confucius was referring to in Analects 2.4 when he 
declared that, at age seventy, he was able to “follow the desires of the heart with-
out overstepping the bounds of right.”
This achieved state, as Li notes, is a form of freedom.53 The emotions are 
unforced and spontaneous and yet have been successfully socialized so that they 
harmonize with practical and social norms. Further, someone with this degree 
of refinement can sense the mood of others, can identify practical needs, and 
has the skills and training needed to transform the mood or emotions of those 
with whom he or she interacts. The emotional impact of such practical skills 
is analogous to the effects of poets on their audience, although the latter work 
solely with words and not actions.
This capacity to transform social interactions is one part of legan wenhua, 
a culture grounded in pleasant feeling. Further, in the Confucian tradition, 
this capacity is often understood to function in a specific context: kinship and 
human relationships. Li writes that “life’s significance emerges only in the con-
text of interpersonal relationships within real-world society”54 and that what 
mattered most in Confucius’ intellectual milieu were “considerations of time-
bound interpersonal relationships and human emotion.”55 It is against such an 
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understanding of the most fundamental aims and purposes of human life—the 
creation of shared delight within networks of human attachment—that the 
value of such freedom becomes clear.
Summarizing the Aesthetic Conception of Freedom
Li’s account of aesthetic cultivation and his interpretation of Analects 8.8 shows 
that there is a robust notion of individual freedom in Confucian thought, one 
that can inform how individual worth and dignity are understood in a Chinese 
modernity. It treats the diverse practical motivations of the human subject’s 
psychological formation (xinli jiegou)—including emotions and intuitions—
as reliable and on an equal footing with narrower conceptions of rationality, 
such as self-consciously acting according to a principle. The rationality resides 
in the cultivated sensibility of the agent and the effectiveness in realizing aes-
thetic ends of beauty, ease, delight, and so forth. In his work, Li consistently 
stresses the role of the unconscious (wuyishi 无疑是) in determining action.56 
However, “unconscious” here often refers to the fact that reasonable action can 
suggest itself to the subject, producing beneficial social results, without the sub-
ject understanding why that course of action presented itself when or as it did. 
This sense of the unconscious thus refers simply to what is not directly available 
to consciousness or what cannot be articulated.57 The lack of detailed justifica-
tion for action does not imply a lack of freedom. Subjects must first understand 
the tradition—the many rituals and social practices that constitute it—from 
which their psychology emerges, while conditioning their psychology in the 
manner indicated by Analects 8.8; only then are their psychological responses 
trustworthy. But at the same time, because the lives of all members of a tradi-
tion are conditioned by the same technologies and social forces, the emotional 
responses of a properly trained subject can resonate with others. Such emotional 
responses are thus not capricious, irrational, or challenging to an otherwise free 
and rational subject, who must willfully resist them; their grounding in shared 
social practices bestows on them a veridical quality.
Furthermore, when the Confucian tradition is understood as a culture in 
which this-worldly aesthetic goods such as pleasure are a primary aim, realized 
through networks of clan or human relationships, then understanding and cre-
ating what brings pleasure to others who share a social world is of utmost value. 
This involves the increasingly effortless capacity to put others and oneself at 
ease, guided by a rich array of psychological prompts—intuitions, emotions, 
practical knowledge. The ability to realize such a higher quality of interaction 
in everyday social life, particularly as shared pleasure, thus becomes an impor-
tant conception of freedom.
Arguably, such pleasures are not simply hedonistic and transient feelings 
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of pleasure but are feelings that emerge as a result of deeper forms of accord and 
successful interaction between people. This is powerfully expressed in Mencius 
4A27, which seems to suggest that the fruit of humaneness, the most powerful 
manifestation of it, is a musical expression of pleasure or delight that arises when 
human relationships are successful: “The most authentic expression of humane-
ness [ren] is serving one’s parents; the most authentic expression of rightness is 
following one’s elder brother. . . . When they come to the point where they can-
not be stopped, then, without realizing it, one’s feet begin to step in time and 
one’s hands begin to dance.”58
Evaluating Li’s Account of Aesthetic Freedom and Its Place in  
a Chinese Modernity
Conceptualizing freedom in the aesthetic realm, while incorporating the defini-
tive characteristics of the Confucian tradition, produces a nuanced account of 
freedom. This freedom is not understood as the mere absence of constraint 
or as crude desire-satisfaction. Rather, freedom becomes a capacity that is 
acquired only through effort and cultivation. A strength of this account is 
that aspects of Confucian social philosophy that initially appear conservative 
and  constraining—the demandingness of, and need for attention to, personal 
attachments and roles—are recast as necessary ingredients of a more meaning-
ful freedom. This account also suggests that a person might be most free when 
actions have a specific and limited focus—the local social world and the human 
relationships. It is here that a person’s actions have the most tangible effect and 
are most “meaningful”—as the emotional impact that accompanies the creation 
of memorable and moving shared social events.
How does this conception of freedom compare with others? Clearly, it is 
a positive notion, requiring that a subject receive support to develop positive 
capacities. It thus contrasts with accounts of negative freedom that focus solely 
on noninterference. Li’s account suggests that a freedom that prizes noninter-
ference is an empty freedom because it ignores substantive questions of what 
human nature is, how this arises through interaction with technology and social 
practices, and how this limits what a person can find satisfying. An individual’s 
thought can fail to track such a nature, and dissonance can arise between what a 
subject thinks will bring happiness and what, in fact, does. Libertarian ideals of 
freedom as isolation or independence are thus opposed at the level of metaphys-
ics and foundational accounts of the self.
A similar objection arises to the classic picture of freedom as being able to 
act on one’s desires. When freedom is understood in such terms, it ignores the 
origins of those desires and whether a person is really free in acting on them. 
The account of freedom derived from Li’s aesthetics suggests, for example, that 
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cruder, biologically rooted desires might be modified, transformed into socially 
responsive desires that are structured around stable external social practices and 
human relationships. Failure to cultivate one’s sensibility, acting instead from 
biological desires, is a failure to attain greater freedom. Since cultivated desires 
lead to greater shared pleasure and to the personal satisfaction in being able 
to direct and contribute socially, they are “higher” desires, indicative of greater 
freedom. Also, this alternative freedom brings with it a stronger sense of duty 
than is recognized on the classical liberal account. On the aesthetic view, free-
dom involves a commitment to social interaction and exchange, for this is the 
arena in which the aesthetic goods of beauty, ease, and pleasure are realized. 
This sense of obligation is not necessarily oppressive, however, but is an essen-
tial condition of realizing these shared affective goods.
In the context of a modernity with Chinese characteristics, how does this 
notion of freedom fit with the contemporary calls for individual freedom and 
rights in China? It is not possible to address this question fully here, but take the 
example of freedom of speech. In the liberal democratic tradition, freedom of 
speech is sometimes understood as having the right to say whatever one wants. 
Clearly, the free exchange of ideas brings many benefits, such as the promo-
tion of technological and economic progress. At the same time, even within 
liberal traditions the ideal of free speech is qualified, from the simple cases of 
prohibiting the shouting of fire in theatres to the more nuanced questions of 
whether hate speech should be permitted. Arguably, this aestheticized notion 
of freedom can contribute to the debate about the limits to free speech—and 
the kinds of goods it might conflict with. An approach that begins from the 
capacity to create ease and pleasure in everyday social networks suggests that 
speech should be treated as a social tool used to positively affect people’s aes-
thetic and emotional lives. The use of speech to bring about ease and delight 
thus imposes restrictions on how speech can be used, since it could bring about 
the opposite effects—increasing anxiety, animosity, and so forth.
Unrestrained speech undoubtedly has many advantages, but focusing on 
the aesthetic realm of human experience reminds us that it is not the only human 
good, and there are times when a variety of human goods are available that can-
not all be realized at the same time. Perhaps the sense of ease, homeliness, and a 
life imbued with a sense of le—pleasurable delight—can sometimes be a good to 
rival the ideal of unrestrained speech. Any claims in this area must be made with 
caution, but an honest and speculative extrapolation of the Confucian tradition 
into the present and future is exactly what Li Zehou has striven to promote.
There are drawbacks to thinking of freedom as the skilled ability to gen-
erate and enjoy pleasure in networks of human relationships. Most obviously, 
focusing on the aesthetic realm and the subject’s immediate social world does 
not address broader political questions. For example, people could expend their 
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energies on family and friends while living in an unjust social system and never 
directly confronting questions of political organization and human rights. The 
aesthetic in Chinese culture has sometimes been a refuge for writers who were 
prevented from addressing more substantive political questions of social orga-
nization. Li himself is mindful of this, citing it as a possible reason for the “aes-
thetics fever” that gripped China in the 1980s.59 However, against this concern, 
it seems entirely reasonable to claim that what most concerns people is often 
not abstract questions of rights and political systems but how their own lives—
understood as local, limited affairs that are largely constituted by personal 
attachment and social interaction—can go as well as possible. And if this is the 
most basic existential question, as Li suggests, then the aesthetic conception of 
freedom is, after all, worthy of further exploration.
I have argued that Li Zehou’s work on aesthetics offers a valuable notion of 
freedom, one in which the individual emerges from material and social forces 
but is not fully determined by them. This is not a freedom construed intellec-
tually, something rooted in clarity of reason and the form and strength of the 
moral will. Rather, it is a freedom that emerges through education and gradual 
mastery of the concrete social practices that constitute the everyday life and 
interactions of the subject. The fruit of such training and enhanced sensibility 
is the capacity to create and share aesthetic goods. This is only one conception 
of freedom, and its importance must be assessed by placing it alongside other 
accounts of freedom, especially political freedoms about which this account has 
little to say. The scope of action for this freedom will be more limited than more 
individualistic notions of freedom as desire-satisfaction, but it is less prone to 
conflict and more easily made to serve a common good. The account is worthy 
of further investigation because of its innovative integration of aesthetic life and 
freedom and because of strong affinities with the Confucian tradition—a tradi-
tion that any viable vision of a Chinese modernity must address.
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